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How Population Size Affects Party Systems and Cabinet Duration 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Do party system characteristics differ in small and large countries, all other conditions 
being the same? If they do, then what is the specific average relationship to the 
population, and why? One may expect that tiny countries would not have room for many 
parties. With fewer parties to divide the pie, the largest party’s share might be larger than 
is the case in larger countries. Also, the governmental cabinets might have fewer parties, 
which might make them more stable. 
 
All these guesses are merely directional. This means they attempt to predict the direction 
of change in party system when population (P) changes (i.e., the sign of dy/dP). They do 
not specify how large the number of parties etc. might be, for a given population. A more 
specific prediction would be offered by a quantitative model that also stipulates the 
expected functional relationship (i.e., the form of y = f[P]), all other conditions having 
medium values. 
 
It is usually easier to test the direction of change than to establish the functional 
relationship. However, the reverse could be the case when both of the following two 
conditions apply: 
 
a) The rate of change is so low that even small random fluctuations could blur the 
empirical trend; and 
 
b) We have a logical model that predicts the functional form of the relationship.  
 
Under these conditions, research emphasis changes from measuring the degree of fit of 
data to an empirical best fit curve, based on the same data, to testing the agreement 
between predicted logical relationship and data that did not enter into construction of the 
model.  
 
It will be seen that this is so in the present case. The impact of population can be expected 
to be so mild that it is hard to prove its existence by statistical means. Yet a logical model 
predicts the zone of occurrence of data largely within a factor of 1.5 (meaning 
multiplying or dividing the mean prediction by 1.5). 
 
We will focus on three characteristics of party systems: the effective number of 
legislative parties (N) and largest seat share (s1) in the first or only chamber of the 
legislative assembly, and the mean duration of cabinets (C) as an importance 
consequence of the number of parties. 
 Previous work 
 
The size (S) of the first or only chamber of representative assemblies (i.e., the number of 
their members) was connected to the population represented (P) by Taagepera (1972) 
both empirically and through a logical model. The simplest expression for this cube root 
law of assembly sizes is 
 
  S = P1/3. 
 
For a population of one million, it predicts S = 100, while for a billion it would be S = 
1000. Marked exceptions are relatively small island nations, whose assemblies fall short 
of the cube root of their populations. A number of other relationships, with predicted 
direction empirically confirmed, were added in the seminal work by Robert Dahl and 
Edward Tufte, Size and Democracy (1973).  
 
A recent overview of ‘Size and Politics’ (Taagepera 2007, Chapter 12) includes more 
recent advances regarding party systems. Its substance will be given here very briefly, 
omitting most of the specific formulas. Smaller countries seem to have a lower number of 
parties registered (Anckar 1998, 2000). Smaller PR countries seem to have higher party 
memberships, per capita (Weldon 2006). Smaller FPTP countries may have a lower share 
of seats going to third parties (Gerring 2005). What is of most interest for the present 
purposes is a string of models that connects several party system indicators to assembly 
size. This is so because assembly size itself connects to population, through the cube root 
law.  
 
The largest seat share (s1) has been shown to logically connect to the product of mean 
district magnitude (M) and assembly size (S) as 
 
  s1 = (MS)
–1/8. 
 
For a set of 46 systems, the correlation coefficient of logarithms of s1 and MS is R
2 = 0.51 
(Taagepera and Ensch 2006, Taagepera 2007: 129). The model applies in principle only 
to ‘simple’ electoral systems, where all seats are allocated in districts of roughly 
comparable magnitude, with no further complexities such as thresholds, second tiers or 
second rounds. Only basic list PR and FPTP qualify as simple, given that all other 
electoral rules add features that are not indispensable. In order to expand the sample, the 
set of 46 also included some Two-Rounds (TR) and Alternative Vote (AV) systems. 
Graphs s1 vs. S for M = 1 systems in Taagepera and Ensch (2006) and Taagepera (2007: 
126) show that TR systems involve wild randomness and reduce the overall R2, while the 
single AV systems (Australia) fits into the general picture. 
 
The effective number of parties (N) also logically connects to the same ‘seat product’ MS: 
 
  N = (MS) 1/6. 
 
For a set of 25 systems, the coefficient of determination between the logarithms of N and 
MS is again R2 = 0.51 (Taagepera 2007: 153).  
 
Finally, the mean duration of cabinets (C) logically connects to the number of parties and 
thus, more indirectly, to the seat product MS: 
 
  C = 42 years / (MS)1/3. 
 
For the previous set of 25 systems, the correlation coefficient of logarithms of C and MS 
is R2 = 0.24 (Taagepera 2007: 171; Taagepera and Sikk 2010). Increased scatter, 
compared to N, reflects the more indirect nature of the connection. The data set includes 
all those systems for which Lijphart (1999) offers cabinet duration1 figures and which 
have almost simple electoral systems: FPTP, simple list PR, and also Single Transferable 
Vote (STV), Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), and TR. The constant value k = 42 
years is the one that best fits the more direct model C = k / N2. No M or S data enter into 
the determination of k.  
 
Party and electoral systems interact of course in both directions. Existing party 
constellations are a most important factor in the choice of electoral rules (Colomer 2005). 
Once fixed, the electoral rules continue exerting pressure on the number of parties both 
directly through the mechanical and indirectly through the psychological effect (Duverger 
1951, Benoit 2002). Our objective here is to assess the aggregate relationship between 
country size/electoral rules and party system characteristics without trying to distinguish 
between the two effects. 
 
Taagepera (2007: 191) points out that combining these models with the cube root law of 
assembly sizes leads to expecting a connection between the party system characteristics 
and population: 
 
  s1 = M 
–1/8P –1/24, 
 
  N = M 1/6P 1/18, and 
 
  C = 42 years(M –1/3P –1/9). 
 
Population enters with horrendously low exponents, however. On logarithmic graphs of 
s1, N and C vs. P, with equal scales on both axes, one would expect straight lines with 
absolute values of slopes 1/24 = 0.0417, 1/18 = 0.0555 and 1/9 = 0.111, respectively, for 
a given value of M. These slopes are so close to zero that even minor random fluctuation 
could reverse the apparent direction of the linear regression slope. Given such 
indeterminacy, Taagepera (2007: 191-2) does not even try to test the equations for s1 and 
N. For C, the geometric means for 8 smaller and 6 larger systems using one-seat districts 
are compared. The larger countries tend indeed to have shorter cabinets (5.8 vs. 7.6 
years), but the ratio is only 1.3, as compared to the expected 1.6. In the following, an 
attempt is made to go further. 
 Many studies in political science aim at empirical accounting for outputs, trying to 
include all variables that conceivably could affect the output. Visibly, our aim is quite 
different and should not be mistaken for empirical data fit. We aim at testing the impact 
of a single factor, population, as predicted by a logical quantitative model. The model 
used indicates that population interacts with district magnitude in a specific way. Thus we 
have to include the latter – but, giving more than lip service to Occam’s Razor, we 
include no more variables. Factors such as the number of social conflicts, including 
ethnic fractionalization (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, Clark and Golder 2006, Mozaffaret 
al. 2003, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, Singer and Stephenson 2009, Stoll 2008, Stoll 
2011, Taagepera 1999, Taagepera and Grofman 1985) federalism and the extent to which 
district-level parties aggregate on national level (Chhibber and Kollman 1998, 2004, 
Chhibber and Murali 2006, Hicken 2009) and parliamentarism/presidentialism (Filippov 
et al. 1999, Golder 2006, Hicken and Stoll 2011, Jones 1994, Lijphart 1994, Shugart and 
Carey 1992) may also affect the outputs considered, but the issue here is not maximal 
accounting for these outputs but testing 1) whether population has any impact in the 
predicted direction (all other factors being more or less random), and more demandingly, 
2) whether it has the degree of impact predicted by the model.  
 
The model and data 
 
To the extent that the cube root law is valid, the seat product MS at the core of the 
previous equations in s1, N and C becomes 
   MS = M(P1/3) = (M3P)1/3. 
 
Hence  
 
  s1 = (M
3P)–1/24, 
 
  N = (M3P)1/18, and 
 
  C = 42 years(M3P)–1/9. 
 
If so, then the logarithms of s1, N and C should have linear relationships to the logarithm 
of (M3P)1/3. 
 
In the special case of M = 1, the equations above simplify to 
 
  s1 = P
–1/24, 
 
  N = P 1/18, and 
 
  C = 42 yearsP–1/9. 
 
We will first test this simple case, by comparing the logarithms of output variables to 
logP. The advantage of this approach is that no assumptions regarding the impact of M 
have to be made. The disadvantage is that the range of P with the appropriate exponent is 
very narrow. For populations ranging from 10,000 to 1 billion, P 1/18 ranges only from 
1.67 to 3.16. Even minor random fluctuations in N can blur out trends when the range of 
the input variable is so narrow. It’s worse for s1 and only slightly more promising for C. 
 
Next, we will test the more general case that includes M > 1, by comparing the 
logarithms of output variables to log(M3P). The advantage here is that the range of 
log(M3P) is much wider than that of logP. Hence, with the same degree of random 
fluctuations in N, trends can become more visible. The disadvantage is that success 
depends on the correctness of the assumption that multi-seat districts magnify the impact 
of population by a factor M3. If this assumption does not hold, we risk with false 
negatives. Note however that false positives are extremely unlikely, as it would require 
that the error on the impact of M exactly cancels out the error on the impact of P.  
 
Included in the analysis are democracies with simple electoral systems (those where all 
seats are allocated in districts, in a single round, with no legal thresholds) for which the 
relevant data for s1, N and C is available (tabulated in Taagepera and Sikk, 2010), adding 
mean population figures for the relevant periods as estimated from Atlas of World 
Population History (McEvedy and Jones 1978) and World Almanac (1993). For N and s1, 
we also consider further countries tabulated in Taagepera and Ensch (2006), which 
extends the population range toward lower P. We exclude the two rounds systems, 
because they are unpredictable in votes-seats transformations (Taagepera 2007: 54, 72) so 
that the models for simple electoral systems clearly do not apply to them. This leaves us 
with a main list (Table 1) of 24 systems with M = 1 (one of them Alternative Vote = 
STV) and 11 with M > 1 (including two STV and one SNTV).  
 
The values shown for S, s1, N and C are geometric means of values for individual 
elections.2 Populations are approximate geometric means of the extremes over the period. 
The impact of minor changes in population is muted by the exponents applied in the 
models, ranging from 1/9 to 1/24. The largest variation in population occurred in Costa 
Rica – from 1 to 3.7 million, with a geometric mean at roughly 2 million. Even if the 
mean should be off by half a million – i.e. by a factor of 2.5/2 = 1.25 – it would alter our 
estimate of mean cabinet duration by a factor of 1.251/9 = 1.025; the estimates of the 
effective number of parties and the largest seat share would be affected much less.3 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Results 
 
Party system predicted from population alone: M = 1 systems   
We will proceed in two stages, first assessing the mean predictions and thereafter looking 
at the fit of actual data with lines proposed by the theoretical models. The logical models 
above predict the average levels around which the fluctuation should take place. For the 
24 M = 1 systems in Table 1, mean populations for the periods considered range from 
0.017 million for Cook Islands to 800 million for India, with a geometric mean of 1.14 
million. Table 2 shows the values calculated using the equations above, the actual 
geometric means, and the percent difference.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The geometric mean values of the largest seat share, effective number of parties, and 
mean cabinet duration are predicted by the logical model within 9% or better, based on 
nothing but population. The logical causal concatenation on which the model in 
Taagepera (2007) is built is P  S  s1  N  C. Thus the error would be expected to 
increase in that order. Surprisingly, this is not the case. The mean prediction for assembly 
size is strongly off. This is due to sixteen of the countries being small island nations that 
tend to have disproportionally small parliaments (see Taagepera 1972). Yet the later 
predictions further down in the causal chain are off by much less, suggesting that 
population may additionally have a direct impact on party systems, bypassing assembly 
size.  
 
Yet graphing the largest seat share against population shows only a faint trend. Figure 1 
graphs s1 against P, both on logarithmic scales. Also shown are the lines corresponding to 
the prediction s1 = P
–1/24 and to deviations from it by a factor of 1.5, i.e., s1 = (3/2)P
–1/24 
and s1 = (2/3)P
–1/24. All the data points are within this range of error, and the geometric 
means of both sets are close to the predicted line. Yet the linear regression line is much 
gentler than the prediction and the fit is poor.4 The picture is similar for the effective 
number and mean cabinet duration (graphs not shown). What does it mean? 
 
This is another instance where a purely statistical approach cannot substitute for logical 
models (cf. Taagepera 2008) and would lead us astray. Compared to the range of random 
fluctuation, the range of the input variable is just too narrow to test for the expected 
slope. We have to find ways to extend this range – and this is where multi-seat systems 
come in. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
  Party system predicted from population and district magnitude   
 
Table 3 shows the geometric means for multi-seat electoral systems listed in Table 1. 
Here the mean for assembly size is close to the cube root of mean population, as only 2 of 
the 11 countries are relatively small. The basis for calculating the mean s1, N and C now 
shifts from mean P to mean M3P. The actual means are predicted within 19%. Here we 
faced a double risk. The model for the effect of population as such could be off, or the 
model for combining population and district magnitude could be off. The quality of the 
prediction offers some confidence on both accounts. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 2 graphs the largest seat share against the product M3P, both on logarithmic scales. 
Different symbols are used for M = 1 and M > 1 systems and the mean points for the two 
sets are shown with bold symbols. Also shown are the lines corresponding to the 
prediction s1 = (M
3P)–1/24 and to deviations from it by a factor of 1.5. All the data points 
are within this range of error, and the geometric means of the three sets are close to the 
predicted line.  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For M = 1 systems, the data cloud exactly replicates Figure 1. Yet the overall picture is 
quite different, as the inclusion of M>1 systems doubles the range of the input variable. 
The linear regression line now approaches the expected line: s1 = 0.981(M
3P)–0.034  
logs1 = –0.019 – 0.034log(M3P), as compared to the expected s1 = M3P–1/24  logs1 = 0 – 
0.0416log(M3P). The precise location of the regression line is still at the merci of a few 
outliers – Israel and The Netherlands at the very high end of the scale. The more 
important question is to what degree the logical model-based line accounts for the 
variation in data, compared to the statistical best fit line. The standard error of estimate 
(SEE) is 0.17 for the OLS best fit and 0.20 for the theoretical model – not appreciably 
less given the mean of logs1 = –0.60 (R2 correspondingly 0.55 and 0.35).5 The model’s 
goodness of fit is strongly affected by the outliers of Finland, Israel and The Netherlands. 
The upper end of the M3P scale is sparsely populated as we are limited to simple electoral 
systems here, while systems with M >> 1 systems tend to use legal thresholds or multiple 
tiers of seat allocation. Rough approximations of predicted largest party’s seat share in 
five European democracies with M3P ranging from 47 to 270 billion presented in 
Appendix B conform reasonably well to the theoretical model. 
 
Similarly, Figure 3 graphs the effective number of parties against the product M3P, for 
data in Table 1. The geometric means of the two sets are close to the predicted line. Only 
two countries deviate from expectation by more than a factor of 1.5, in opposite 
directions. Papua New Guinea had a profusion of tribally based parties, while Botswana 
had only one large and one small party, both based on ethnic identity. SEE and R2 are 
heavily affected by Papua New Guinea. High levels of ethnic fractionalization have been 
shown to increase N (Singer and Stephenson 2009) – Papua New Guinea ‘approximates a 
perfectly fractionalized state’ (Fearon 2003: 205) and as it deviates by more than two 
standard deviations from the best fit line, its exclusion is justified because of potentially 
massive impact of ethnic heterogeneity. Without Papua New Guinea, the regression line 
is N = 0.928(M3P)0.055  logN = –0.075 + 0.055log(M3P), as compared to the expected N 
= (M3P)1/18  logN = 0 – 0.056log(M3P). Here too, the observations do not deviate from 
theoretically based predictions appreciably more than from those based on OLS 
estimation (see Figure 4) and the model-based line has a SEE (0.21) very close to that of 
OLS regression (0.19) (correspondingly, R2 = 0.66 versus R2 = 0.72).6  
 
 [FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, Figure 5 graphs the mean duration of cabinets against the product M3P for the 24 
systems for which the data are available. Once more, the geometric means of the two sets 
are close to the predicted line, but nine systems deviate from expectation by more than a 
factor of 1.5, in opposite directions. For Papua New Guinea and Botswana, the deviations 
in cabinet duration are logical consequences of their unusual effective numbers of parties. 
While these cases can be explained, there is no obvious way to account for the opposite 
deviations of stable democracies such as Finland and The Netherlands, except for 
acknowledging their deviant party systems (see Figure 2 and 3). In the logical causal 
concatenation P  S  s1  N  C, cabinet duration is simply so far removed from 
population that the latter’s impact becomes blurred. 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Statistically speaking, exclusion of no country is justified here. The regression line is 
logC = log(36.3yrs) – 0.096log(M3P). It is still not far off the expected logC = 
log(42yrs) – 0.11log(M3P), particularly in the middle of the data cloud. Once again, the 
model-based line fits the data as well as the OLS line: for theoretical model, SEE = 0.65 
and for OLS model SEE = 0.63 (R2 = 0.33 versus R2 = 0.38, respectively). What matters 
is that the predicted zone still includes two-thirds of the data points and the rest is 
positioned evenly around it. 
 
Nationwide PR elections   
For nationwide PR elections, district magnitude equals assembly size: M = S. Then, to the 
extent that the cube root law is valid, M3 = S3 = P, so that the core expression M3P 
becomes P2. The previous equations in s1, N and C simplify into 
 
  s1 = P
-1/12, 
 
  N = P1/9, and 
 
  C = 42 yearsP–1/4.5. 
 
With increasing population, these values change much more rapidly than is the case with 
one-seat districts.  
 
Testing is difficult because most countries with nationwide PR balance it with 
appreciable legal thresholds on votes, so as to keep the number of parties down. Table 1 
includes only two systems with nationwide PR, and even these have mild thresholds: 1% 
for Israel and 0.67% for The Netherlands. Table 4 shows the degree of agreement. The 
actual values are off in the direction expected when legal thresholds are applied. They are 
off by up to 35%, except for cabinet duration for The Netherlands, which is much higher 
than expected (cf. Figure 4). 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Logically predictable effect, largely blurred by other factors   
A look at Figures 2 to 4 confirms that population does affect the largest seat share, the 
effective number of parties and mean duration of cabinets, conjointly with district 
magnitude, for simple electoral systems. All other factors (and district magnitude in 
particular) being the same, larger countries have smaller seat shares going to the top 
party. Larger countries tend to have more parties and shorter cabinets. The effect of 
logM3P remains robust when controlling for other factors that may affect party systems 
and cabinet durations, such as ethnic fractionalization, presidentialism and federalism. 
When introduced in OLS models on their own or in interaction with district size, only the 
effect of fractionalization is statistically significant (p < 0.05) on logs1 and logN, with 
Papua New Guinea having high leverage.7 
 
It is important to go beyond these directional conclusions. The party system 
characteristics of most systems can be predicted within a factor of 1.5 using a logical 
model that combines population and district magnitude. For countries using one-seat 
districts, this boils down to predicting party system characteristics based solely on 
population. 
 
Over large differences in population, these logical predictions vary appreciably. For an 
FPTP country of 100,000, an effective number of parties of 1.9 would be predicted, while 
it would be 2.8 for an FPTP country of 100 million (see Figure 5), and 3.6 for a country 
of 100,000 that applies nationwide PR. The respective largest seat shares would be 62%, 
46% and 39%. The expected cabinet durations would be 11.5, 5.3 and 3.2 years, 
respectively. 
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]  
 
The catch is that the largest seat shares of individual countries are observed to vary within 
a factor of 1.4 of these averages (cf. Figures 1 and 2). Deviations are even larger for the 
effective number of parties (Figure 3) and especially for cabinet duration (Figure 4). 
Within such a range, countries have appreciable leeway. This leeway is more limited, if 
countries wish to adhere to a definite brand of democracy, as discussed next. 
 
Population dependency of the majoritarian and consensus models of democracy 
 
Consider first countries determined to hold on to FPTP. Such countries probably have in 
mind the majoritarian ideal of a single-party cabinet and a mostly single-party opposition 
of an almost equal strength, such as in 52-48, with regular alternation in power at every 
election but no cabinet change in between. This would mean s1 = 0.52, N = 2.00 and C = 
4 years (assuming elections every 4 years). Does population place limitations on reaching 
such an average outcome?  
 
Data scatter in Figure 1 shows that a largest seat share of 52% has been obtained with 
populations as low as 40,000 and as high as 70 million. This covers most of the entire 
range of sovereign countries. However, most countries of less than one million tend to 
have an overly dominant largest party, facing a combined opposition reduced to less than 
one-third of the seats. The majoritarian ideal of a strong opposition seems hard to reach in 
very small countries. 
 
For the effective number of parties to range around 2 (say, from 1.8 to 2.2), populations 
in Figure 3 are observed to range from 2 to 50 million. Below 1 million, the 
preponderance of the largest party reduces N to appreciably less than 2. On the high side, 
countries above 10 million population tend to have N larger than 2.2, reflecting third-
party incidence.  
 
As for duration of cabinets, no M = 1 systems in Figure 4 happen to have mean durations 
around 4 years. Durations are either below 3 years, denoting frequent cabinet changes in 
between elections, or above 6 years, denoting the same party remaining in power for a 
second or even third term in a row. Our model predicts that regular alternation every 4 
years would be the likeliest for very large countries. The only actual case (India), 
however, has had appreciably more frequent changes. 
 
In sum, for M = 1 countries our model predicts that the majoritarian ideal could be best 
satisfied by populations around ten million on the account of largest seat share, around 
0.5 million on the account of effective number of parties, and rather incongruously, 
around 1 billion for cabinet duration. In this light, the ideal of two party alternation may 
involve an internal contradiction.  
 
Actual data suggest that countries below one million have major difficulties in holding up 
the majoritarian ideal. Their largest party tends to dominate the assembly excessively, 
reducing the 2-party system to a one-and-a-half party system. Moreover, the same party 
tends to be in power for several electoral periods in a row. The mechanism behind this 
outcome is rooted in an excessive largest party bonus in conversion of vote shares to seat 
shares, due to small assembly sizes – see Lijphart (1990). At the other extreme, very 
populous FPTP countries might be expected to have difficulty avoiding strong third 
parties, but actual evidence is inconclusive. 
 
Shifting now to multi-seat PR systems, many of them conform to the consensus model as 
described by Lijphart (1999), with a large effective number of parties, small largest seat 
share, and frequently reshuffled coalition cabinets. However, these are not explicit goals, 
such as single party majorities and two-party alternation are for the majoritarian model. 
They are merely the outcomes, once the electoral system allows for small party 
representation. Maximal small party representation is achieved with nationwide PR. In 
the absence of legal thresholds, the model predicts an effective number of 2.8 parties 
even for a population of 10,000. The largest party would have 47% of the seats and 
cabinets would last 5.5 years, on the average. Consensual countries usually have a more 
fractionalized party system than that.  
 
A population of 10 million could expect an effective number of parties of N = 6. The 
largest party would have only 26% of the seats and cabinets would be reshuffled once 
every 1.2 years, on the average. This is about the most fractionalized party system that we 
observe among those that still have some stability. Larger countries than 10 million 
would have to avoid nationwide PR or add restrictive legal thresholds.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Scientists going beyond pure empirics should find it exciting that the means of some 
party system characteristics at given population can be predicted without any data input, 
solely on the basis of population, using a set of logical models. These characteristics are 
the seat share of the largest party and the effective number of assembly parties. The mean 
duration of cabinets can be added to the list.8 The solely population based prediction 
applies to First-Past-The Post and possibly to other single-round one-seat electoral 
systems. By multiplying the population by the cube of district magnitude – another 
logically motivated step – the prediction can be extended to those multi-seat electoral 
systems where all seats are allocated within districts. In all this, political science proceeds 
beyond empirical description to quantitative prediction on logical grounds.  
 
The theoretical model presented and tested in this article is concerned with an indirect 
link between country size a party system – i.e. working through assembly size. There is 
no evidence for an additional direct effect on the effective number of parties and cabinet 
duration, as the residuals (i.e. ratios of actual to theoretically expected N-s and C-s) are 
not correlated with country size. When it comes to the size of the largest party, increasing 
population reduces it somewhat less than predicted by our model (see Figure 7). Yet, the 
effect is mild at best and we currently lack a theoretical model to explain the empirical 
discrepancy. This is also well visible in Figure 2 where the slopes for theoretical and 
empirical fit lines differ much more than for N and C. Therefore, we broadly agree with 
Dahl & Tufte that all modern democracies are too populous for there to be any 
discernible direct effects – these may appear on the level of municipal party systems 
(1973: 94-97). The proposed and tested model can be used as a baseline for studies on 
any direct effects or the impact of other societal factors that may affect party systems and 
cabinet duration (including analysis of individual cabinets rather than aggregate measures 
as is the case here).  
 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
While population has a definite overall effect on size characteristics of party systems, for 
individual countries this effect is heavily blurred by other factors. Only First-Past-The 
Post countries of less than one million are markedly hemmed in; they could expand their 
one-and-a-half party systems only by shifting to PR. Thus population is not destiny, as far 
as party system is concerned. 
 
What are the practical implications? Countries are not prisoners of their population sizes. 
They are not locked in regarding their choice of party systems. Although we are far from 
such determinism, population still puts some limits on party systems. 
 
Appendix A. Summary of Models  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Appendix B: Testing the Theoretical Model in Complex Electoral Systems 
 
Most countries that employ proportional representation use legal thresholds or multi-tier 
seat allocation. In such systems, M is impossible to determine exactly. However, 
approximations can in many cases be calculated based on a premise that if a legal 
threshold is used, the electoral system functions roughly as a single nationwide 
constituency with estimated effective magnitude  
 
Meff = (75% / Tlegal) – 1 (Taagepera 2007: 246).  
 
While such estimates are rough, great precision is not of paramount importance here. 
Even if the estimated effective magnitude is off the ‘real’ Meff by a factor of two, the 
prediction of s1 is only off by less than 10%, and by about 5% for an error within a 
faction of 1.5 in Meff.  
 
The estimates of M for complex systems are interesting as they enable us to add data to 
the sparsely populated higher end of M3P. Table 6 shows the estimates together with 
predicted and actual values of s1 in five European democracies where we would expect 
high values of M3P. The predicted values for s1 are remarkably close to actual s1 in most 
cases. Adding the approximations to the dataset would bring the OLS coefficient for 
logM3P closer to theoretical -0.042 (-0.034  -0.037) and enhance the fit with the 
theoretical model (SEE: 0.20  0.19, R2: 0.35  0.49). It suggests that the countries 
with high M3P included in our main dataset may in fact be outliers and if more countries 
could be added, the goodness of fit for the model would be improved (see Figure 8). 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
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FIGURES  
Figure 1 The largest seat share vs population for M = 1 countries  
 
Notes: Bold line: theoretically based prediction (R2 = –0.22, i.e. the sum of squared distances 
from mean s1 is smaller than the sum of squared distances from values predicted by the model.) 
Thin line: OLS best fit between logarithms (R2 = 0.17) 
 
Figure 2. The largest seat share vs the product of population and district magnitude cubed.  
 
Notes:  
Bold line: theoretically based prediction (R2 = 0.35). Thin line: OLS best fit between logarithms 
(R2 = 0.55) 
Figure 3. Effective number of assembly parties vs the product of population and district 
magnitude cubed.  
 
Notes: Bold line: theoretically based prediction (R2 = 0.54). Thin line: OLS best fit between 
logarithms (R2 = 0.56) 
 
Figure 4. Deviation from theoretically predicted N vs N predicted by regression. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of observations that lie within a certain factor from the 
expected values. E.g. about 60 percent of observations lie within the factor of 1.2 (i.e. divided or 
multiplied by 1.2) from the theoretically predicted N. Papua New Guinea not shown.  
Figure 5. Mean duration of cabinets vs the product of population and district magnitude 
cubed.  
 
Notes: Bold line: theoretically based prediction (R2 = 0.33). Thin line: OLS best fit between 
logarithms (R2 = 0.38) 
 
Figure 6. Effective number of parties for given population and district magnitude 
 
 
Figure 7. Residuals of largest seat share vs population. 
 
 
Figure 8. The largest seat share vs the product of population and district magnitude cubed, 
approximations for complex electoral systems included 
 
TABLES 
Table 1. Population, seat allocation rule, mean district magnitude (M), assembly size (S), largest 
seat share (s1), effective number of legislative parties (N), and cabinet duration (C) for 25 one-
seat and 11 multi-seat systems.  
 Population 
(million) 
M M3P 
(billion) 
Rule S s1 N C 
(years) 
Cook Islands 1965-99 0.017 1 1.7∙105 FPTP 23.2 0.609 1.97  
St. Kitts 1980-2000 0.04 1 4.0∙105 FPTP 10.5 0.539 2.44  
Antigua 1980-99 0.07 1 7.0∙105 FPTP 17.0 0.781 1.52  
Dominica 1975-2000 0.07 1 7.0∙105 FPTP 21.0 0.621 2.02  
Grenada 1972-2003 0.1 1 1.0∙104 FPTP 15.0 0.676 1.71  
St. Vincent 1974-2001 0.1 1 1.0∙104 FPTP 14.1 0.765 1.50  
St. Lucia 1974-2001 0.13 1 1.3∙104 FPTP 17.0 0.696 1.66  
Samoa 1979-2001 0.19 1 1.9∙104 FPTP 47.6 0.531 2.33  
Belize 1979-2003 0.2 1 2.0∙104 FPTP 26.5 0.691 1.65  
Bahamas 1972-2002 0.25 1 2.5∙104 FPTP 42.0 0.732 1.68 14.9 
Barbados 1966-94 0.25 1 2.5∙104 FPTP 26.0 0.700 1.76 9.5 
Trinidad 1961-2001 1.2 1 0.0012 FPTP 36.0 0.746 1.82 10.0 
Botswana 1965-2004 1.3 1 0.0013 FPTP 37.0 0.749 1.35 39.6+  
Norway 1882-1903  2.1 1 0.0021 FPTP 114.4 0.585 2.13  
Jamaica 1962-89 2.5 1 0.0025 FPTP 55.0 0.755 1.62 9.2 
Denmark 1884-1913 2.5 1 0.0025 FPTP 109.9 0.539 2.51  
New Zealand 1946-96 3 1 0.003 FPTP 85.0 0.569 1.96 6.3 
Papua New Guinea 1977-97 4 1 0.004 FPTP 108.0 0.397 5.98 1.7 
Sweden 1887-1905 5 1 0.005 FPTP* 226.3 0.511 2.20  
Australia 1946-96 12 1 0.012 STV 128.0 0.507 2.22 9.9 
Canada 1945-93 18 1 0.018 FPTP 270.0 0.555 2.37 8.0 
United Kingdom 1945-97 50 1 0.05 FPTP 635.0 0.534 2.11 8.6 
United States 1947-2001 230 1 0.23 FPTP 435.0 0.619 2.40 7.7 
India 1977-96 800 1 0.8 FPTP 542.0 0.550 4.11 2.4 
Geometric mean for M = 1 1.14    59.7 0.615 2.08 7.99 
Malta 1966-87 0.3 5 0.038 STV 59.0 0.529 1.99 10.6 
Luxembourg 1945-99 0.35 14.2 1 L 56.4d 0.411 3.36 6.0 
Costa Rica 1953-98 2 7.8 0.95 L 55.0 0.524 2.41 4.9 
Ireland 1948-97 3 3.5 1.3 STV 154.0 0.482 2.84 3.8 
Israel 1949-96 4 120 6900 L 120.0 0.379 4.55 1.8 
Norway 1945-97 4 7.7 1.8 L 154.0 0.466 3.35 4.3 
Finland 1945-2003 4.5 14 12.3 L 200.0 0.268 5.03 1.5 
Portugal 1976-2002 9 11.3 13 L 249.0 0.430 3.33 3.2 
Netherlands 1946-2002 13 140 35700 L 137.7e 0.344 4.65 3.3 
Spain 1977-2004 35 6.7 10.5 L 350.0 0.501 2.76 9.0 
Japan 1946-96 110 4 7 SNTV 486.0 0.540 3.71 3.9 
Geometric mean for M > 1   10.85  145.6 0.434 3.33 4.06 
Source: Adjusted from Taagepera and Sikk (2010) and Taagepera and Ensch (2006). Additional data 
based on Nohlen et al (2001) and Nohlen (2005).  
Notes: Seat allocation rules: FPTP – First-Past-The-Post; STV – single transferable vote; L – list PR; 
SNTV – single non-transferable vote. 
* Multi-member districts in five largest towns (Mackie & Rose 1974: 341) 
Table 2. Actual geometric means of system characteristics and predictions based on mean 
population, 24 M = 1 countries. 
 Actual Geometric Mean Calculated from Mean Population Difference 
Population 1.14·106   
Assembly size 59.7 104.6  +75% 
Largest seat share 0.615 0.559 –9% 
Effective number 
of parties 
2.08 2.17  +4% 
Mean cabinet 
duration* 
7.99 yrs 7.35 yrs –8% 
* Based on the 12 countries for which the data are available (geometric mean of population 
6.51·106). 
Table 3. Actual geometric means of system characteristics and predictions based on mean 
population, 11 M > 1 countries 
 
Actual Geometric Mean 
Calculated from Mean P or 
M3P 
Difference 
Population 4.62·106   
Assembly size 145.3 166.6  +15% 
Magnitude3·Population 8.8·109   
Largest seat share 0.434 0.385 –11% 
Effective number of 
parties 
3.33 3.57  +7% 
Mean cabinet duration 4.06 yrs 3.30 yrs –19% 
Note: Assembly size is calculated from P, the other outputs from M3P. 
Table 4. Predicted characteristics for countries with nationwide PR, and factor by which the 
actual value is off. 
 ISRAEL NETHERLANDS 
 Predicted Actual Factor Predicted Actual Factor 
s1 0.282 0.379 1.34 0.255 0.344  1.35 
N 5.41 4.55 1.18 6.17 4.65  1.33 
C (years) 1.43 1.75 1.22 1.10 3.3  3.00 
 
Table 5. Comparison of theoretical and OLS coefficients and model fits 
 s1 (M=1)  s1  N  C 
 theor.  
model 
OLS1  theor.  
model 
OLS1 OLS2  theor.  
model 
OLS1 OLS2  theor.  
model 
OLS1 OLS2 
 
log(M3P) – –  –0.042 –
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
–  0.056 0.054*** 
(0.008) 
–  –0.111 –0.096*** 
(0.027) 
– 
logM – –  –0.125a – –
0.122*** 
(0.021) 
 0.167a – 0.153*** 
(0.033) 
 –0.333a – –0.270*** 
(0.089) 
logP –0.042 –0.025** 
(0.012) 
 –0.042a – –0.021* 
(0.011) 
 0.056a – 0.059*** 
(0.018) 
 –0.111a – –0.126*** 
(0.063) 
constant 0 –0.136 
(0.172) 
 0 –0.019 
(0.095) 
–0.197 
(0.163)  
 0 –0.017 
(0.145) 
–0.085 
(0.256)  
 3.74 3.59*** 
(0.53) 
4.04*** 
(1.01) 
Coefficients in exponential modelb 
M3P – –  –0.042 –0.034  –  0.056 0.054 –  –0.111 –0.096  – 
M – –  – – –0.122   – – 0.153  – – –0.270 
P –0.042 –0.025  – – –0.021  – – 0.059   – – –0.126 
Multiplierc 1 0.873  1 0.981 0.821  1 0.983 0.919  42yrs 36.3yrs 56.9yrs 
SEE 0.19 0.16  0.20 0.17 0.17  0.26 0.26 0.26  0.65 0.63 0.64 
R2 –0.22 0.17  0.35 0.55 0.57  0.54 0.56 0.56  0.33 0.38 0.39 
N 24 24  35 35 35  35 35 35  23 23 23 
Notes: Standard errors of OLS models are in parenthesis. OLS1 – models with log(M3P) as an independent variable, OLS2 – models with logM 
and logP entered individually. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
a Applies for OLS2 only. 
b See page 7. 
c multiplier = exp(constant) 
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Table 6. Estimates of predicted and actual s1 in complex electoral systems 
 Legal threshold 
Tlegal 
Estimated 
Meff 
Estimated 
M3P 
Expected 
s1 
Actual 
s1 
Years 
Germany 5% 14 270·109 0.33 0.33 1989–2005 
Denmark 2% 37 253·109 0.33 0.35 1945–2007 
Poland 5% 14 135·109 0.34 0.32 1991–2007 
Sweden 4%* 9 52.5·109 0.39 0.44 1948–2006 
Austria 4% 18 47·109 0.36 0.44 1945–2008 
Source: Parties and Elections in Europe, http://www.parties-and-elections.de/ (accessed 2 
September 2009) 
Notes: 
* Corresponding to Meff = 18. Yet, Sweden has a very small number of national compensation 
mandates (39 out of the total 349) and in most districts M < 18. The 4% threshold applies 
nationally (disregarding the alternative 12% district level threshold that has never been put into 
practice). Hence, our estimate of Meff is based on mean M with an upper constraint of M = 18 = 
(75% / 4%) – 1.  
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Notes 
 
1 We measured cabinet duration used ‘average cabinet life I’ (see Dodd 1976 and Lijphart 1999: 132–3). 
This index best fits the stipulated logical relationship. 
2 We analyze means rather than individual elections for several reasons. First, we believe that party systems 
are durable characteristics of political systems. Secondly, there is very little variation over time in our 
independent variables and in most dependent variables. Geometric means are less sensitive than arithmetic 
means to untypically high values of the variables.  
3 Other factors mentioned above that may affect party systems have in most cases been fairly constant in 
political systems under study here. Analyzing means rather than levels of dependent variables over time is 
justified here as country size and mean district magnitude stay constant over long periods and could not 
possibly explain fluctuations in party systems and cabinet duration over time. 
4 Coefficients from OLS models and indicators of fit of theoretical and OLS models are given in Appendix 
A. Here, the coefficient of determination for the predicted line is negative. This may look erroneous since 
the common range for R2 is from 0 to 1. However, that strictly applies to OLS best fit lines only. For other 
lines, the R2 – as based on the most frequently used formula – can be negative. Other fitting methods that 
are less sensitive to outliers (such as robust regression, quantile regression and deepest regression, see 
Wilcox 2005) would result in similar best fit lines in Figure 1 and in the Figures below. For an extensive 
discussion on the properties and variants of R2 see Kvalseth (1985). 
5 SEE reflects the standard deviation of model residuals. While the widely used R2 shows predictive 
capability of the model (Lewis-Beck & Skalaban 1990), SEE has certain advantages over R2 (see Achen 
1990), especially as it has the same units as the dependent variable. As we use logarithms of our dependent 
variables throughout the study, SEE has to be transformed to make the units meaningful. If SEE = 0.20 as 
in the case of logs1, exp(0.20) = 1.22 is the standard (multiplicative) factor of deviation in s1. 
6 With Papua New Guinea included, SEE = 0.26 for both theoretical and OLS fit (R2 = 0.54 versus R2 = 
0.56). From the perspective of empirical model fitting it might be tempting to include logarithms of M and 
P independently – that does not only untie the coefficients but also frees up the exponent of M. The 
resulting coefficients (logM: 0.153 and logP: 0.059) are strikingly close to the theoretical model (logM: 
0.167 = 3x0.056 and logP: 0.056); a trivial improvement in model fit would be accompanied by an increase 
in the degrees of freedom and thus a lower F-statistic. The same applies for the other two models discussed 
in this study – see Appendix A for models with logP and logM included separately.  
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7 We used operationalizations from Singer & Stephenson 2009, adding fractionalization data from Alesina 
et al 2003 for small island states. Resulting models are available on request. 
8 Cabinet duration involves a parameter (42 years) determined empirically from the relationship between N 
and C. No data on P or M enters this determination. 
